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COMIREX-M-70

1 May 1969

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COMMITTEE ON IMAGERY REQUIREMENTS AND EXPLOITATION

NRO & DIA REVIEWS COMPLETED

COMIREX-M-70

1 May 1969

Approved for Release
1 May 1969

The following is an index of the Minutes of the 1 May 1969
COMIREX meeting:

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in Crisis Situations

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Section II (NPIC Report)

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Page 18 Approval of Priorities for Mission 1051

[Redacted]
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GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM
AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING
AND DECLASSIFICATION

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CORONA (COMIREX-D-13.6/1)

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Page 21 Security and Handling Policy for South China Drone
Overflights (COMIREX-D-2.3/1; reference
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Page 21 [REDACTED] (COMIREX-D-32.6/2)

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Section VI (Other Business)

Page 22 Duplication in Maintenance of Area Coverage File

Tabs

Page 23 Tab B - [REDACTED] Coverage of North Vietnam
as of 30 April 1969

Page 24 Tab C - The Value of Near Real Time Imagery in
Crisis Situations

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1 May 1969

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Special Briefing

Value of Near Real-time Imagery in Crisis Situations

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1. [] repeated for the benefit of COMIREX members the briefing he had presented to the Land Panel on 24 April (See paragraph 1, Section IV, this Minute). In introducing the briefing, [] said that the main purpose of the briefing was to identify photography that had been available to us at crisis situation times in the past and its value to us. He said it was quite evident that each crisis has its own background and scenario; each has its own indices and observables; but in every case confidence in the information available, or credibility, is next in importance to timeliness.

2. A set of the briefing aids employed by [] in his briefing are attached at Tab C.

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Section I (Approval of Minutes, Briefings, and Reports on Operations)

Approval of Minutes

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1. COMIREX-M-66 was approved. It was noted that the Air Force representative for both COMIREX-M-66 and COMIREX-M-67 should have been listed as [redacted] rather than [redacted]

2. COMIREX-M-67 was approved with the addition of the following paragraph submitted by the DIA member. The new paragraph is to be inserted on page 8 following paragraph 8. The old paragraph 9 should be renumbered paragraph 10.

"9. [redacted] indicated that he had requested the NRO presentation for COMIREX because of difficulties encountered in ICRS during preparation of Mission Priorities Statements. He indicated that it was important for COMIREX, as well as ICRS, to fully understand and appreciate the implications of our guidance to the operators. He indicated that the recommendations of the NRO presentation appeared reasonable and should serve as guidelines for J-Mission Priorities development. He also suggested that COMIREX concur in the near term operational ground rules for KH-4B tasking."

A typographical error in the last line of paragraph 7 on page 18 should be corrected: change "pans" to "pairs".

3. COMIREX-M-68 was approved.

4. COMIREX-M-69 was approved with the following correction made by the Department of State member:

Page 16, paragraph 14, line 9 -- change "political situation" to "political/military situation".

Operational Briefing--Satellite

5. [redacted]

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6. [redacted]

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6. In answer to questions, [] confirmed that as of now Mission 1051 is set to go on schedule tonight and will have a 20-minute window for launch. It was noted that this is to be the first evening launch in some time.

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Report on Aircraft Activities--Far East

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7. After confirming that no IDEALIST/TACKLE or FOOD FAIR missions were flown during the period 18 April - 1 May, [] reported that, of a total of 23 BUMPY ACTION missions, 16 were successful; six low and one high were lost. He commented that one drone apparently crash landed in Thailand but the film was successfully recovered and processed. Details of the BUMPY ACTION missions are given below:

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<u>DATE</u>	<u>MISSION NO.</u>	<u>AREAS/TARGETS</u>	<u>RESULTS</u>
18 Apr	Q539/Q039(Low)	Hanoi POW-Coloc, SAM 166, Gia Lam Afld	Lost
18 Apr	Q540/Q040(Low)	Haiphong Port, Haiphong Nav Base	MARS
19 Apr	Q532A/Q041(Low)	Hon Gai Port Fac, Haiphong Port Fac, Kien An Afld, Nam Dinh TPP, Thanh Hoa Tsp, Seg Rte 1A	Lost
20 Apr	Q527/Q043(Low)	SAM 73, Kep Afld, Hiep Hoa Afld	MARS
20 Apr	Q243/Q044(High)	DMZ, Seg Rtes 1A, 15, 101, Vinh Compl, Thanh Hoa Compl, Bai Thuong Afld	MARS
21 Apr	Q541/Q045(Low)	Haiphong Port Fac, Cat Bi Afld	MARS
21 Apr	Q902/Q046(High)	DMZ, Rte 15, Tuyen Quang Compl, Yen Bai Afld, Na San Afld	Lost
22 Apr	Q526/Q047(Low)	SAM 73, Phuc Yen Afld, Hanoi Port Fac	MARS
23 Apr	Q889N/Q050(Low SRE)	Bai Thuong Afld, Thanh Hoa Transp Pt	MARS
24 Apr	Q540/Q051(Low)	Haiphong Naval Base, Haiphong Port Fac	MARS

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BUMPY ACTION ACTIVITIES cont.

<u>DATE</u>	<u>MISSION NO.</u>	<u>AREAS/TARGETS</u>	<u>RESULTS</u>
24 Apr	Q508A/Q053(Low)	Yen Vien RR Yd, Gia Lam Afld, Hanoi Port Fac, Bac Mai Afld, Nam Dinh Transp Pt, Nam Dinh TPP	MARS
25 Apr	Q902/Q054 (High)	DMZ, Rte 15, Tuyen Quang Compl, Yen Bai Afld, Na San Afld	Crashed in Thailand, film recovered
25 Apr	Q521/Q055(Low)	Haiphong Port Fac, Kien An Afld	Lost
26 Apr	Q541/Q056(Low)	Haiphong Port Fac, Cat Bi Afld	MARS
26 Apr	Q536A/Q057(Low)	Hanoi Radar Msl Cntl, Hanoi Halo & PW, Hanoi POW Detn Citadel	MARS
27 Apr	Q507A/Q058(Low)	Yen Vien RR Yd, Hanoi/Gia Lam Afld, Hanoi Port Fac, Bac Mai Afld	Lost
28 Apr	Q509/Q060(Low)	Kien An Afld, Cat Bi Afld	Lost
29 Apr	Q540/Q062(Low)	Haiphong Nav Base, Haiphong Port Fac	MARS
29 Apr	Q243/Q063(High)	DMZ, Seg Rtes 1A, 15, 101, Vinh Compl, Thanh Hoa Compl, Bai Thuong Afld	MARS
30 Apr	Q530/Q064(Low)	Nam Dinh Transp Pt, Phuly-Hanoi RR, Bac Mai Afld, Yen Vien RR Yd, Hanoi Radar SA-2 Msl Cntl System	Lost
30 Apr	Q503/Q065(Low)	Rte 15, Vinh Son Compl	MARS
1 May	Q501/Q066(Low)	Vinh Afld, Vinh Compl, Rtes 1A & RR, Dong Hoi	MARS
1 May	Q542/Q067(Low)	Kien An Afld, Rtes 10, 1A	MARS

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8. [] reported GIANT SCALE missions during the same period as follows:

<u>DATE</u>	<u>MISSION NO.</u>	<u>AREAS/TARGETS</u>	<u>RESULTS</u>
23 Apr	GS137	Hoa Lac Afld, Xom Aplo Ammo Stor and PW Camp, Viet Tri RR Yd, Rte 1A, WW 19A, RR 4, Cst Seg 11 and 12	Fair
1 May	GS138	Viet Tri RR Yd, Xom Aplo Ammo Stor, Hoa Lac Afld, Rte 1A, Seg V thru Z, RR 4, Seg C and D	Unknown

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9. [] reported attempts to satisfy two principal South China/North Vietnam requirements as follows:

a. No surveillance Coverage of Lines of Communications (LOC) pertinent to the introduction of Chinese forces into North Vietnam (see COMOR-D-25/207, 4 March 1966) was reported for the period 24-30 April 1969. The number of LOC priority targets in South China and North Vietnam remains at 352.

b. Coverage of North Vietnam to detect the possible introduction or deployment of offensive missile systems (see COMOR-D-25/200, 23 May 1967 and COMIREX-D-25.3/2, 20 November 1967) is shown on the grid map at Tab B for the period 17-23 April 1969. Four BUMPY ACTION missions flown during this time period and reported as successful have not been included. No SSM activity was observed.

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Report on Aircraft Activities -- Cuba

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10. [] reported that there were no GLASS LAMP activities to report because of a standdown following the EC-121 incident.

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11. [] reported that for the 56-day period beginning 6 March 1969 twelve GLASS LAMP missions were flown over Cuba and provided 89.3 percent coverage of the area. During this period 172 of the [] targets in Cuba were covered completely on cloud-free photography.

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Section III

(Subcommittee and Working Group Reports)

(Note: Some material presented by Subcommittee and Working Group Chairmen at the time they are called on to make their reports is reported elsewhere in the Minutes and is not repeated in this Section).

Exploitation Research and Development Subcommittee []

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1. [] reported that the main emphasis over the next two months will be on getting R & D funds obligated before the end of the fiscal year.

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Section IV (Action Items)

Briefing of Land Panel on Crisis Situations (Reference Special
Briefing, page 5 of this Minute)

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1. The Chairman reported that the Land Panel had requested a COMIREX briefing on the problem of coverage of crisis situations. The briefing, which was presented by [redacted] was very well received. [redacted] impression from discussions which followed [redacted] briefing was that Dr. Land and the panel were even more insistent than in previous sessions that a near real-time readout system is an essential thing that must be pushed, and, for that reason, if no other, COMIREX should move along on taking a new look at requirements for near real-time readout so that they can be wrapped up within the next few months.

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2. [redacted] said that two important points came out of [redacted] briefing that had a direct impact on the Panel's considerations:
(1) It seemed clear that we needed a system that was on orbit and not on call. The problem of anticipating when you would need the system is so difficult that you almost have to have it all of the time, and
(2) A system that will do the early warning/indications job will do this job also.

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3. [redacted] noted that, to complete the picture of the uses of near real-time readout, COMIREX should do an analysis of its value in routine intelligence production.

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Information Required for DBWG to Prepare Quarterly Resource Report

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4. [] reported to the Chairman that he still had not received all of the information required to produce the quarterly resource report. Information is lacking from DIA, NPIC, Army, and on the OPICs. The Chairman again (Reference COMIREX-M-69, page 16, paragraph 15) requested that members representing the delinquent agencies get this information in to [] as soon as possible.

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Lack of Progress in Preparation of Basic Support Exploitation Requirements for FY 1970

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5. [] reported that EXSUBCOM is behind schedule in the preparation of basic support exploitation requirements for FY 1970. Whereas it was originally intended that the proposed program would have been reviewed and approved by COMIREX by 1 May, EXSUBCOM has not even received information as to what the needs for in-depth exploitation will be during the next fiscal year. [] urged COMIREX members to do everything possible within their agencies to get the needed information to EXSUBCOM. The Chairman asked members to have their organizations get a first draft to [] before 8 May.

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Approval of Priorities for Mission 1051

6. The Chairman, ICRS, reported that the coordinated priorities for Mission 1051 included 14 "Extraordinary" targets. He commented, too, that it had been possible to keep the number of target points at approximately 100 as had been recommended by OSP in its recent briefing to COMIREX (Reference COMIREX-M-67, page 7).

7. COMIREX approved the priorities for Mission 1051 as presented by the Chairman, ICRS.

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Section V (Status of Recent COMIREX Papers)

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Flexibility--Quick Response Capability for CORONA (COMIREX-D-13.6/1)

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1. [] Referred to the discussion on flexibility at the COMIREX meeting on 17 April (Reference COMIREX-M-69, page 13) and noted that General Berg had forwarded a detailed response to the questions raised at that time. General Berg's memorandum was distributed to COMIREX members as an attachment to COMIREX-D-13.6/1. The Chairman said that he felt General Berg's memorandum highlights the situation we are in--we do not have any flexibility.

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2. During discussion of the lack of flexibility in the CORONA launch schedule it was pointed out that, if there is an accident which destroys the pad, it would cost in the neighborhood of [] to bring the standby pad to full operational status. A switch to a second pad could be accomplished in 60 days.

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3.

[] suggested that a COMIREX clarification of requirements outlining differences between "crisis response" and "standby" might be helpful in order for all to better understand the specific urgency to be attached in each situation.

4. The Chairman commented that we have worked hard to squeeze down on money spent and now have a schedule that meets our predictable requirements so long as nothing goes wrong. However, if we feel that flexibility is important, the only possible way to get it is by spending money.

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5. [] reported that the Executive Secretary, USIB, had called this morning and that [] felt a report on the question of flexibility should be prepared to go to USIB. The Chairman said that he will have a draft paper prepared and circulated for discussion at a COMIREX meeting later this month.

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Support of Special Projects Office (Department of the Interior) at
Reston (COMIREX-D-15.8/5)

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6. The Acting CIA member felt that the draft memorandum to USIB which had been prepared by the MCGWG left some questions unanswered and indicated that his Agency could not concur in it as presently written. [] pointed out, however, that he sees no objection to releasing all available domestic KH-4 material as well as available KH-5, [] over the United States that would be useful to the USGS.

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8. The NRO consultant pointed out that his office should receive graphic displays of requirements for domestic coverage at least six weeks ahead of time to give them time to plan the [] units and the engineering targets.

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9. The Security consultant reported that he had received a priority request from [] of the USGS for the release of available KH-4 photography of Alaska for use in mapping the northern quadrant of Alaska. COMIREX agreed that it had the authority to act for USIB in this matter and authorized [] to release KH-4 photography of Alaska held by TOPOCOM to USGS.

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10. The Chairman, MCGWG, was directed to have his Working Group reconsider the paper and to present a redraft covering the points discussed to COMIREX on 8 May 1969.

Selective Target Printing (COMIREX-D-34.3/1)

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11. [] said that, in light of questions raised by [] he felt it was time that COMIREX take a good hard look at the subject of selective target printing. The DIA member indicated that he felt [] memorandum (attachment to COMIREX-D-34.3/1) gives us a good guideline as to the steps we ought to undertake. [] also said that he felt COMIREX should consider doing a summary paper on what we are doing and what needs to be done [] advent of the []

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12. The Chairmen of DBWG, EXSUBCOM, and EXRAND were directed to study the question of selective target printing and report back to COMIREX at a later date.

Security and Handling Policy for South China Drone Overflights (COMIREX-D-2.3/1; Reference COMIREX-M-68, page 15)

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13. There having been no request by a COMIREX member to have the above paper discussed at COMIREX, it is hereby made a matter of record that the security and handling policy for South China drone overflights was approved by COMIREX this date.

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14. Since no proposed changes to the above paper were telephoned to the Office of the Chairman prior to 24 April, it is made a matter of record that the document, changed to reflect editorial changes approved at the COMIREX meeting on 17 April, was distributed on 25 April 1969 as COMIREX-D-32.6/2A.

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Section VI (Other Business)

Duplication in Maintenance of Area Coverage File

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1. The DIA member reported that, in response to a COMIREX request (COMIREX-M-56 page 22), a mosaic index of KH-4 coverage prepared by DIA has been coordinated at the working level with Army, Navy, Air Force, CIA, and the MC&G community. It looks as though NPIC will be able to discontinue the production of the mosaic it has been producing. paper has been circulated as an attachment to COMIREX-D-32.6/3 and will be scheduled as an agenda item for the COMIREX meeting of 22 May].

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Executive Secretary
Committee on Imagery Requirements and Exploitation

Attachments
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THE VALUE OF NEAR REAL TIME IMAGERY IN CRISIS SITUATIONS

THIS BRIEFING IS CLASSIFIED:

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CATEGORIES OF INTELLIGENCE WITH SIGNIFICANT TIME URGENCY IMPLICATIONS

- **WARNING/INDICATIONS INTELLIGENCE**
- **CRISIS INTELLIGENCE**
- **CURRENT INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION**

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CRISIS

- ★ **CRISIS is defined as that crucial time, stage, or event during which U.S. national interests are in actual or potential jeopardy. It requires prompt and intensive consideration at the highest national level together with a concurrent review of pertinent U.S. policies and options. Under such conditions, crisis periods are characterized by an uncompromising demand for a more authoritative, continuous and timely flow of intelligence.**

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➡ **ARE THERE SIGNIFICANT AND UNIQUE OBSERVABLES
RELEVANT TO AN UNDERSTANDING AND ASSESSMENT
OF SPECIFIC CRISIS SITUATIONS ?**

➡ **WHAT HAS BEEN THE RESPONSIVENESS AND ADEQUACY
OF RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS IN PROVIDING
INFORMATION ON SUCH OBSERVABLES IN TERMS OF
TIMING, SWATH AND RESOLUTION ?**

➡ **WOULD NEAR REAL TIME AWARENESS OF CRISIS-RELATED
OBSERVABLES PROVIDE A SUBSTANTIALLY IMPROVED
BASIS FOR INTELLIGENCE JUDGMENTS AND NATIONAL
POLICY PLANNING ?**

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CRISIS SITUATIONS

- CZECHOSLOVAKIAN INTERVENTION (AUG 1968)
- MIDDLE EAST WAR (JUN 1967)
- NORTH KOREAN PROVOCATIONS (JAN 1968
AND APR 1969)
- CUBAN CRISIS (OCT 1962)

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OUTLINE

- INTELLIGENCE PROBLEM(S)
- TARGET STRUCTURE
- RECONNAISSANCE CAPABILITIES
- ANALYSIS OF RESULTS
- IMPLICATIONS OF NEAR REAL TIME READOUT

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CRISIS DURATION

Czechoslovakia

20 AUG ▼ 27 AUG




Middle East War

5 JUN ▼ 11 JUN



Pueblo

23 JAN ▼ 29 JAN



EC-121

15 APR ▼ 24 APR



Cuba

14 OCT ▼ 28 OCT ▼ 9 NOV

▼ 6 DEC



 CRISIS BUILDUP

 CRITICAL CRISIS PERIOD

 CRISIS SUBSIDENCE

25X1D

Approved For Release 2003/04/23 : CIA-RDP79B01709A000800040007-4

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Approved For Release 2003/04/23 : CIA-RDP79B01709A000800040007-4